On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation

Published

Journal Article

We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents' standard one-period reaction functions and the one-period Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set. Applications include contribution, oligopoly, and rent-seeking games. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Romano, R; Yildirim, H

Published Date

  • January 1, 2005

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 120 / 1

Start / End Page

  • 73 - 107

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-0531

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.005

Citation Source

  • Scopus