Distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition

Published

Journal Article

I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an allocation. The contest can either take place at a pre-bargaining stage, yielding "persistent recognition" to propose, or recur throughout the bargaining, yielding "transitory recognition". Equilibrium analysis reveals that surplus is distributed more unequally under persistent recognition; social cost is higher under persistent recognition if and only if it attracts a sufficient number of "active" bargainers; and individual's incentive to propose under transitory recognition may actually increase in the number of agents, while this incentive always diminishes under persistent recognition. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Yildirim, H

Published Date

  • January 1, 2010

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 142 / 1-2

Start / End Page

  • 41 - 57

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0048-5829

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/s11127-009-9470-7

Citation Source

  • Scopus