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Public information and electoral bias

Publication ,  Journal Article
Taylor, CR; Yildirim, H
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior
January 1, 2010

We present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close, and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate. These findings suggest that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences (e.g., through pre-election polls or expert forecasts) may undermine the democratic process. Our analysis reveals that if the distribution of political preferences is common knowledge, then the unique type-symmetric equilibrium leads to a stark neutrality result in which each alternative is equally likely to win the election. By contrast, when citizens are ignorant about the preference distribution, the majority is more likely to win the election and expected voter turnout is lower. Welfare is, therefore, unambiguously higher when citizens possess less information about the preference distribution. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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Published In

Games and Economic Behavior

DOI

EISSN

1090-2473

ISSN

0899-8256

Publication Date

January 1, 2010

Volume

68

Issue

1

Start / End Page

353 / 375

Related Subject Headings

  • Economic Theory
  • 3803 Economic theory
  • 3801 Applied economics
  • 1402 Applied Economics
  • 1401 Economic Theory
 

Citation

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Taylor, C. R., & Yildirim, H. (2010). Public information and electoral bias. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), 353–375. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.007
Taylor, C. R., and H. Yildirim. “Public information and electoral bias.” Games and Economic Behavior 68, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 353–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.007.
Taylor CR, Yildirim H. Public information and electoral bias. Games and Economic Behavior. 2010 Jan 1;68(1):353–75.
Taylor, C. R., and H. Yildirim. “Public information and electoral bias.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 68, no. 1, Jan. 2010, pp. 353–75. Scopus, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.007.
Taylor CR, Yildirim H. Public information and electoral bias. Games and Economic Behavior. 2010 Jan 1;68(1):353–375.
Journal cover image

Published In

Games and Economic Behavior

DOI

EISSN

1090-2473

ISSN

0899-8256

Publication Date

January 1, 2010

Volume

68

Issue

1

Start / End Page

353 / 375

Related Subject Headings

  • Economic Theory
  • 3803 Economic theory
  • 3801 Applied economics
  • 1402 Applied Economics
  • 1401 Economic Theory