A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs

Journal Article (Journal Article)

We provide a unified analysis of the canonical rational voting model with privately known political preferences and costs of voting. Focusing on type-symmetric equilibrium, we show that for small electorates, members of the minority group vote with a strictly higher probability than do those in the majority, but the majority is strictly more likely to win the election. As the electorate size grows without bound, equilibrium outcome is completely determined by the individuals possessing the lowest cost of voting in each political group. We relate our equilibrium characterization to Myerson's Poisson games, and examine the potential uniqueness of equilibrium. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Taylor, CR; Yildirim, H

Published Date

  • January 1, 2010

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 70 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 457 - 471

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1090-2473

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0899-8256

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.008

Citation Source

  • Scopus