Informal social networks and Rational Voting
Classical rational choice explanations of voting participation are widely thought to have failed. This article argues that the currently dominant Group Mobilization and Ethical Agency approaches have serious shortcomings in explaining individually rational turnout. It develops an informal social network (ISN) model in which people rationally vote if their informal networks of family and friends attach enough importance to voting, because voting leads to social approval and vice versa. Using results from the social psychology literature, research on social groups in sociology and their own survey data, the authors argue that the ISN model can explain individually rational non-altruistic turnout. If group variables that affect whether voting is used as a marker of individual standing in groups are included, the likelihood of turnout rises dramatically. © 2010 Cambridge University Press.
Duke Scholars
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- Political Science & Public Administration
- 4408 Political science
- 4407 Policy and administration
- 1606 Political Science
- 1605 Policy and Administration
Citation
Published In
DOI
EISSN
ISSN
Publication Date
Volume
Issue
Start / End Page
Related Subject Headings
- Political Science & Public Administration
- 4408 Political science
- 4407 Policy and administration
- 1606 Political Science
- 1605 Policy and Administration