Alternatives and defaults: Knobe's two explanations of how moral judgments influence intuitions about intentionality and causation

Published

Journal Article

Knobe cites both relevant alternatives and defaults on a continuum to explain how moral judgments influence intuitions about certain apparently non-moral notions. I ask (1) how these two accounts are related, (2) whether they exclude or supplement supposedly competing theories, and (3) how to get positive evidence that people consider relevant alternatives when applying such notions. © 2010 Cambridge University Press.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Sinnott-Armstrong, W

Published Date

  • August 1, 2010

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 33 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 349 - 350

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1469-1825

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0140-525X

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1017/S0140525X1000186X

Citation Source

  • Scopus