Sampling out: regulatory avoidance and the Total Coliform Rule.

Published

Journal Article

This paper investigates strategic noncompliance with the Total Coliform Rule (TCR) under the U.S. Safe Drinking Water Act. The structure of the TCR provides incentives for some piped drinking water systems to avoid violations by taking additional water quality samples. We estimate the prevalence of this behavior and its potential impact on violations using monthly data for more than 500 Massachusetts water systems, 1993-2003. We find evidence that strategic oversampling is occurring. Water systems most likely to avoid violations by oversampling are most likely to oversample. A significant number of additional violations would have occurred if systems had adhered to legal sampling requirements, rather than oversampling. Our analysis of potential impacts of regulatory avoidance under the current rule suggests that alternative policies for monitoring bacteria in drinking water should be considered.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Bennear, LS; Jessoe, KK; Olmstead, SM

Published Date

  • July 2009

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 43 / 14

Start / End Page

  • 5176 - 5182

PubMed ID

  • 19708338

Pubmed Central ID

  • 19708338

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1520-5851

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0013-936X

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1021/es803115k

Language

  • eng