On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations

Journal Article (Journal Article)

The preference between public and private negotiations for a buyer who sequentially visits two sellers is examined. It is shown that the buyer (weakly) prefers private negotiations so as to create strategic uncertainty about the trade history. With substitute goods, such uncertainty is valuable only when price offers have short deadlines that prevent a head-to-head competition. With complementary goods, strategic uncertainty is valuable to the extent that price coordination becomes a concern for sellers, which is likely to be the case when sellers possess high bargaining powers; their price offers have short deadlines; and/or goods are weak complements. Sellers' strategic deadline choices as well as their incentives to disclose information about negotiations are also investigated. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Krasteva, S; Yildirim, H

Published Date

  • July 1, 2012

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 75 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 714 - 730

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1090-2473

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0899-8256

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.009

Citation Source

  • Scopus