Theories of coalitional rationality

Published

Journal Article

This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. A strategy is epistemic coalitionally rationalizable if it is consistent with rationality and common certainty that every coalition is rational. A characterization of this solution set is provided for operators satisfying four basic properties. Special attention is devoted to an operator that leads to a solution concept that is generically equivalent to the iteratively defined concept of coalitional rationalizability. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Ambrus, A

Published Date

  • March 1, 2009

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 144 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 676 - 695

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1095-7235

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-0531

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.jet.2007.03.010

Citation Source

  • Scopus