Price dispersion and loss leaders
Dispersion in retail prices of identical goods is inconsistent with the standard model of price competition among identical firms, which predicts that all prices will be driven down to cost. One common explanation for such dispersion is the use of a loss-leader strategy, in which a firm prices one good below cost in order to attract a higher customer volume for profitable goods. By assuming each consumer is forced to buy all desired goods at a single firm, we create the possibility of an effective loss-leader strategy. We find that such a strategy cannot occur in equilibrium if individual demands are inelastic, or if demands are diversely distributed. We further show that equilibrium loss leaders can occur (and can result in positive profits) if there are demand complementarities, but only with delicate relationships among the preferences of all consumers. Copyright © 2008 Attila Ambrus and Jonathan Weinstein.
Duke Scholars
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- Economic Theory
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1401 Economic Theory
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Published In
EISSN
Publication Date
Volume
Issue
Start / End Page
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1401 Economic Theory