Cooperation over finite horizons: A theory and experiments

Published

Journal Article

This paper shows that the presence of different types of players - those who only care about their own material payoffs and those who reciprocate others' contributions - can explain the robust features of observed contribution patterns in public good contribution games, even without the presence of asymmetric information. We show what conditions on reciprocity are sufficient for a unique perfect equilibrium, in which contributions are decreasing. Under these conditions, selfish players have enough future benefits to induce subsequent contributions by reciprocal players, and this incentive diminishes as the end of the game approaches. The model explains the puzzling restart effect and is consistent with various other empirical findings. We also report the results of a series of experiments, using a probabilistic continuation design in which after each set of 10-period games, the group is restarted with low probability. We find specific support for the theory in our data, including that selfish players (identified exogenously) stop contributing earlier than reciprocal players, as directly implied by the model. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Ambrus, A; Pathak, PA

Published Date

  • August 1, 2011

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 95 / 7-8

Start / End Page

  • 500 - 512

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0047-2727

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.016

Citation Source

  • Scopus