Voting methods, problems of majority rule, and demand-revealing procedures

Published

Journal Article

Gordon Tullock made fundamental conceptual contributions to the understanding of collective choices. Tullock balanced an optimism about the capacity of political choices to facilitate gains from exchange with a pessimism about the negative externalities attending having majorities control power and dictate choices for all. Tullock's work on both sides of this divide is surveyed, examining both the problems of voting procedures, and the promise of the demand-revealing process he helped invent, in guiding the choice of political institutions. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Munger, MC

Published Date

  • July 1, 2012

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 152 / 1-2

Start / End Page

  • 61 - 72

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0048-5829

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/s11127-011-9856-1

Citation Source

  • Scopus