Evaluating resistance to false-name manipulations in elections

Published

Journal Article

In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where the mechanism designer cannot completely prevent false-name manipulation, but may use false-name-limiting methods such as CAPTCHAs to influence the amount and characteristics of such manipulation. Such a designer would prefer, first, a high probability of obtaining the "correct" outcome, and second, a statistical method for evaluating the correctness of the outcome. In this paper, we focus on settings with two alternatives. We model voters as independently drawing a number of identities from a distribution that may be influenced by the choice of the false-name-limiting method. We give a criterion for the evaluation and comparison of these distributions. Then, given the results of an election in which false-name manipulation may have occurred, we propose and justify a statistical test for evaluating the outcome. Copyright © 2012, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. All rights reserved.

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Waggoner, B; Xia, L; Conitzer, V

Published Date

  • November 7, 2012

Published In

  • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volume / Issue

  • 2 /

Start / End Page

  • 1485 - 1491

Citation Source

  • Scopus