The law and economics of public health

Journal Article (Journal Article)

The fundamental question addressed by this paper is whether or not and the extent to which imposing tort liability on potential injurers improves the public's health. Conceptually, imposing the threat of litigation on potential injurers gives them an incentive to exercise more care than they would absent the threat. While the conclusion might seem to be obvious at first glance, in reality, the conclusion is far from obvious. For one, insurance coverage may blunt incentives to take care. Also, the tort system may operate far less perfectly than the theory would have it. In the end, the question must be answered on the basis of empirical evidence. © 2007 F. A. Sloan and L. M. Chepke.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Sloan, FA; Chepke, LM

Published Date

  • December 1, 2007

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 3 / 5-6

Start / End Page

  • 331 - 490

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1547-9854

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1547-9846

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1561/0700000020

Citation Source

  • Scopus