Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match

Published

Journal Article

The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences-ties-in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school-single tiebreaking-in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21).

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Abdulkadiroǧlu, A; Pathak, PA; Roth, AE

Published Date

  • December 1, 2009

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 99 / 5

Start / End Page

  • 1954 - 1978

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0002-8282

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1257/aer.99.5.1954

Citation Source

  • Scopus