College admissions with affirmative action

Published

Journal Article (Review)

This paper first shows that when colleges' preferences are substitutable there does not exist any stable matching mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student. The paper introduces student types and captures colleges' preferences for affirmative action via type-specific quotas: A college always prefers a set of students that respects its type-specific quotas to another set that violates them. Then it shows that the student-applying deferred acceptance mechanism makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student if each college's preferences satisfy responsiveness over acceptable sets of students that respect its type-specific quotas. These results have direct policy implications in several entry-level labor markets (Roth 1991). Furthermore, a fairness notion and the related incentive theory developed here is applied to controlled choice in the context of public school choice by Abdulkadiroǧ lu and Sönmez (2003). © Springer-Verlag 2005.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Abdulkadiroǧlu, A

Published Date

  • November 1, 2005

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 33 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 535 - 549

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0020-7276

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/s00182-005-0215-7

Citation Source

  • Scopus