College admissions with affirmative action

Journal Article (Review;Journal)

This paper first shows that when colleges' preferences are substitutable there does not exist any stable matching mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student. The paper introduces student types and captures colleges' preferences for affirmative action via type-specific quotas: A college always prefers a set of students that respects its type-specific quotas to another set that violates them. Then it shows that the student-applying deferred acceptance mechanism makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student if each college's preferences satisfy responsiveness over acceptable sets of students that respect its type-specific quotas. These results have direct policy implications in several entry-level labor markets (Roth 1991). Furthermore, a fairness notion and the related incentive theory developed here is applied to controlled choice in the context of public school choice by Abdulkadiroǧ lu and Sönmez (2003). © Springer-Verlag 2005.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Abdulkadiroǧlu, A

Published Date

  • November 1, 2005

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 33 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 535 - 549

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0020-7276

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/s00182-005-0215-7

Citation Source

  • Scopus