Room assignment-rent division: A market approach


Journal Article

A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Abdulkadiroǧlu, A; Sönmez, T; Ünver, MU

Published Date

  • June 1, 2004

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 22 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 515 - 538

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0176-1714

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/s00355-003-0231-0

Citation Source

  • Scopus