Mixed strategies and iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies: An experimental investigation of states of knowledge


Journal Article

The iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies (IESDS) and mixed-equilibrium solution concepts are studied in an iterated two-person investment game with discrete strategy spaces, non-recoverable investments, and either equal or unequal investment capital. In this game, the player investing the largest amount wins the competition and receives a fixed reward; ties are counted as losses. Both cases of symmetric and asymmetric dyads are studied theoretically and experimentally. Results from two experiments provide support for the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution on the aggregate but not the individual level, and evidence for a hierarchy of bounded IESDS. © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Rapoport, A; Amaldoss, W

Published Date

  • January 1, 2000

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 42 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 483 - 521

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0167-2681

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00101-3

Citation Source

  • Scopus