Mixed-strategy play in single-stage first-price all-pay auctions with symmetric players


Journal Article

We consider sealed-bid, first-price, all-pay auctions with complete information, discrete strategy space, budget constraint, and symmetric players, and then construct the equilibrium solution in mixed strategies for both fixed and variable prizes. The equilibrium solution yields predictions concerning the effects of group size and value of the prize that are tested experimentally. The experimental results support equilibrium play on the aggregate but not individual level. Adaptive learning on the individual level accounts for the major trends in the aggregate expenditures over time. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Rapoport, A; Amaldoss, W

Published Date

  • January 1, 2004

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 54 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 585 - 607

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0167-2681

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.jebo.2002.10.003

Citation Source

  • Scopus