Compatibility, interoperability, and market power in upgrade markets


Journal Article

We examine the market power of a seller who repeatedly offers upgraded versions of a product. In the case of pure monopoly, the seller also controls compatibility across versions. In the case of an entrant who offers an upgrade, the incumbent seller also controls subsequent interoperability across versions. We argue that control of compatibility and interoperability does not allow an incumbent seller to charge a price premium relative to when such control is absent and, consequently, neither is a necessary source of market power. © 2010 Taylor & Francis.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Anton, JJ; Biglaiser, G

Published Date

  • June 1, 2010

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 19 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 373 - 385

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1476-8364

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1043-8599

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1080/10438591003603163

Citation Source

  • Scopus