Markets for partially contractible knowledge: Bootstrapping versus bundling

Published

Journal Article

We discuss how a seller can appropriate rents when selling knowledge that lacks legal property rights by solving either an expropriation or a valuation problem and then analyze how seller rents increase when a portion of the intellectual property (IP) can be protected. The analysis shows that a sequential strategy in which the protected portion of the IP is sold prior to selling the unprotected IP is superior to selling both portions of the IP as a bundle. © 2005 by the European Economic Association.

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Anton, JJ; Yao, DA

Published Date

  • April 1, 2005

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 3 / 2-3

Start / End Page

  • 745 - 754

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1542-4774

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1542-4766

Citation Source

  • Scopus