Computing a profit-maximizing sequence of offers to agents in a social network

Published

Journal Article

Firms have ever-increasing amounts of information about possible customers available to them; furthermore, they are increasingly able to push offers to them rather than having to passively wait for a consumer to initiate contact. This opens up enormous new opportunities for intelligent marketing. In this paper, we consider the limit case in which the firm can predict consumers' preferences and relationships to each other perfectly, and has perfect control over when it makes offers to consumers. We focus on how to optimally introduce a new product into a social network of agents, when that product has significant externalities. We propose a general model to capture this problem, and prove that there is no polynomial-time approximation unless P=NP. However, in the special case where agents' relationships are symmetric and externalities are positive, we show that the problem can be solved in polynomial time. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Bhattacharya, S; Korzhyk, D; Conitzer, V

Published Date

  • December 26, 2012

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 7695 LNCS /

Start / End Page

  • 482 - 488

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1611-3349

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0302-9743

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_36

Citation Source

  • Scopus