Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games

Published

Journal Article

Computing optimal strategies to commit to in general normal-form or Bayesian games is a topic that has recently been gaining attention, in part due to the application of such algorithms in various security and law enforcement scenarios. In this paper, we extend this line of work to the more general case of commitment in extensive-form games. We show that in some cases, the optimal strategy can be computed in polynomial time; in others, computing it is NP-hard. © 2010 ACM.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Letchford, J; Conitzer, V

Published Date

  • July 23, 2010

Published In

  • Proceedings of the Acm Conference on Electronic Commerce

Start / End Page

  • 83 - 92

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1145/1807342.1807354

Citation Source

  • Scopus