A compact representation scheme for coalitional games in open anonymous environments

Published

Journal Article

Coalition formation is an important capability of automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Recent research has revealed that traditional solution concepts, such as the Shapley value, core, least core, and nucleolus, are vulnerable to various manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. These manipulations include submitting false names, collusion, and hiding some skills. To address this, a solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust against such manipulations, was developed. However, the representation size of the outcome function in the anonymity-proof core (and similar concepts) requires space exponential in the number of agents/skills. This paper proposes a compact representation of the outcome function, given that the characteristic function is represented using a recently introduced compact language that explicitly specifies only coalitions that introduce synergy. This compact representation scheme can successfully express the outcome function in the anonymity-proof core. Furthermore, this paper develops a new solution concept, the anonymity-proof nucleolus, that is also expressible in this compact representation. We show that the anonymity-proof nucleolus always exists, is unique, and is in the anonymity-proof core (if the latter is nonempty), and assigns the same value to symmetric skills. Copyright © 2006, American Association for Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A; Yokoo, M; Maruono, K; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T

Published Date

  • November 13, 2006

Published In

  • Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volume / Issue

  • 1 /

Start / End Page

  • 697 - 702

Citation Source

  • Scopus