A new solution concept for coalitional games in open anonymous environments

Published

Journal Article

Coalition formation is a key aspect of automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Various solution concepts (such as the Shapley value, core, least core, and nucleolus) have been proposed. In this paper, we demonstrate how these concepts are vulnerable to various kinds of manipulations in open anonymous environments such as the Internet. These manipulations include submitting false names (one acting as many), collusion (many acting as one), and the hiding of skills. To address these threats, we introduce a new solution concept called the anonymity-proof core, which is robust to these manipulations. We show that the anonymity-proof core is characterized by certain simple axiomatic conditions. Furthermore, we show that by relaxing these conditions, we obtain a concept called the least anonymity-proof core, which is guaranteed to be non-empty. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Yokoo, M; Conitzer, V; Sandholm, T; Ohta, N; Iwasaki, A

Published Date

  • January 1, 2006

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 4012 LNAI /

Start / End Page

  • 53 - 64

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1611-3349

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0302-9743

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/11780496_6

Citation Source

  • Scopus