Can stable social groups be maintained by homophilous imitation alone?

Journal Article

A central problem in the biological and social sciences concerns the conditions required for emergence and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Most models and experiments have been pursued in a game-theoretic context and involve reward or punishment. Here, we show that such payoffs are unnecessary, and that stable social groups can sometimes be maintained provided simply that agents are more likely to imitate others who are like them (homophily). In contrast to other studies, to sustain multiple types we need not impose the restriction that agents also choose to make their opinions different from those in other groups. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Durrett, R; Levin, SA

Published Date

  • 2005

Published In

  • Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volume / Issue

  • 57 / 3

Start / End Page

  • 267 - 286

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.09.017