The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters?
Public opposition often hinders the siting of nuisance and noxious facilities. However, there is often support for the siting plan within the community, especially when the facility will bring economic development or a compensation package funded by the company siting the facility. Why have opponents of these facilities been so effective compared to supporters? This article presents evidence that opponents of siting proposals are much more likely to vote or engage in other collective action, while supporters are more likely to remain passive and not take action to advance their position. The results suggest that political mechanisms for determining host communities for facilities such as town meetings or referenda may not accurately represent the preferences of the community and that opportunities for siting may be missed.
Duke Scholars
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Related Subject Headings
- Finance
- 1504 Commercial Services
- 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
- 1402 Applied Economics
Citation
Published In
DOI
ISSN
Publication Date
Volume
Issue
Start / End Page
Related Subject Headings
- Finance
- 1504 Commercial Services
- 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
- 1402 Applied Economics