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The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters?

Publication ,  Journal Article
Mansfield, C; Van Houtven, G; Huber, J
Published in: Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics
January 1, 2001

Public opposition often hinders the siting of nuisance and noxious facilities. However, there is often support for the siting plan within the community, especially when the facility will bring economic development or a compensation package funded by the company siting the facility. Why have opponents of these facilities been so effective compared to supporters? This article presents evidence that opponents of siting proposals are much more likely to vote or engage in other collective action, while supporters are more likely to remain passive and not take action to advance their position. The results suggest that political mechanisms for determining host communities for facilities such as town meetings or referenda may not accurately represent the preferences of the community and that opportunities for siting may be missed.

Duke Scholars

Published In

Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics

DOI

ISSN

0895-5638

Publication Date

January 1, 2001

Volume

22

Issue

2-3

Start / End Page

141 / 161

Related Subject Headings

  • Finance
  • 1504 Commercial Services
  • 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
  • 1402 Applied Economics
 

Citation

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Mansfield, C., Van Houtven, G., & Huber, J. (2001). The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters? Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 22(2–3), 141–161. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007883228345
Mansfield, C., G. Van Houtven, and J. Huber. “The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters?Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 22, no. 2–3 (January 1, 2001): 141–61. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007883228345.
Mansfield C, Van Houtven G, Huber J. The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters? Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. 2001 Jan 1;22(2–3):141–61.
Mansfield, C., et al. “The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters?Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, vol. 22, no. 2–3, Jan. 2001, pp. 141–61. Scopus, doi:10.1023/A:1007883228345.
Mansfield C, Van Houtven G, Huber J. The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters? Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics. 2001 Jan 1;22(2–3):141–161.
Journal cover image

Published In

Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics

DOI

ISSN

0895-5638

Publication Date

January 1, 2001

Volume

22

Issue

2-3

Start / End Page

141 / 161

Related Subject Headings

  • Finance
  • 1504 Commercial Services
  • 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
  • 1402 Applied Economics