Psychologically rational choice: Selection between alternatives in a multiple-equilibrium game
Choice is modeled by game theory through analyses of the structure of a game situation. However, at least some choices, such as those in games that have more than one rational solution, are difficult to address under standard game theory. We investigated choice in a simple multiple-equilibrium game, Wolf's Dilemma, and found that choice depends on both structural components of the game, such as the number of opponents, and non-structural components, such as judgments about opponents' likely choices. Significant effects of trial-to-trial sequence were identified. We conclude that game theoretic methods cannot deal with multiple and equilibrium games in the absence of a psychological understanding of choice, and that psychological measures are required to predict performance in such games. © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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