Natural selection of memory-one strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.


Journal Article

In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, mutually cooperative behavior can become established through Darwinian natural selection. In simulated interactions of stochastic memory-one strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Nowak and Sigmund discovered that cooperative agents using a Pavlov (Win-Stay Lose-Switch) type strategy eventually dominate a random population. This emergence follows more directly from a deterministic dynamical system based on differential reproductive success or natural selection. When restricted to an environment of memory-one agents interacting in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games with a 1% noise level, the Pavlov agent is the only cooperative strategy and one of very few others that cannot be invaded by a similar strategy. Pavlov agents are trusting but no suckers. They will exploit weakness but repent if punished for cheating.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Kraines, DP; Kraines, VY

Published Date

  • April 2000

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 203 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 335 - 355

PubMed ID

  • 10736212

Pubmed Central ID

  • 10736212

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1095-8541

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-5193

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1006/jtbi.2000.1089


  • eng