Natural selection of memory-one strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.
In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, mutually cooperative behavior can become established through Darwinian natural selection. In simulated interactions of stochastic memory-one strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Nowak and Sigmund discovered that cooperative agents using a Pavlov (Win-Stay Lose-Switch) type strategy eventually dominate a random population. This emergence follows more directly from a deterministic dynamical system based on differential reproductive success or natural selection. When restricted to an environment of memory-one agents interacting in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games with a 1% noise level, the Pavlov agent is the only cooperative strategy and one of very few others that cannot be invaded by a similar strategy. Pavlov agents are trusting but no suckers. They will exploit weakness but repent if punished for cheating.
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Related Subject Headings
- Selection, Genetic
- Population Dynamics
- Models, Genetic
- Memory
- Mathematics
- Humans
- Game Theory
- Evolutionary Biology
- Cooperative Behavior
- Animals
Citation
Published In
DOI
EISSN
ISSN
Publication Date
Volume
Issue
Start / End Page
Related Subject Headings
- Selection, Genetic
- Population Dynamics
- Models, Genetic
- Memory
- Mathematics
- Humans
- Game Theory
- Evolutionary Biology
- Cooperative Behavior
- Animals