Natural selection of memory-one strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.

Published

Journal Article

In the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, mutually cooperative behavior can become established through Darwinian natural selection. In simulated interactions of stochastic memory-one strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Nowak and Sigmund discovered that cooperative agents using a Pavlov (Win-Stay Lose-Switch) type strategy eventually dominate a random population. This emergence follows more directly from a deterministic dynamical system based on differential reproductive success or natural selection. When restricted to an environment of memory-one agents interacting in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games with a 1% noise level, the Pavlov agent is the only cooperative strategy and one of very few others that cannot be invaded by a similar strategy. Pavlov agents are trusting but no suckers. They will exploit weakness but repent if punished for cheating.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Kraines, DP; Kraines, VY

Published Date

  • April 2000

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 203 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 335 - 355

PubMed ID

  • 10736212

Pubmed Central ID

  • 10736212

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1095-8541

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-5193

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1006/jtbi.2000.1089

Language

  • eng