Claiming a large slice of a small pie: asymmetric disconfirmation in negotiation.

Published

Journal Article

Three studies show that negotiators consistently underestimate the size of the bargaining zone in distributive negotiations (the small-pie bias) and, by implication, overestimate the share of the surplus they claim (the large-slice bias). The authors explain the results by asymmetric disconfirmation: Negotiators with initial estimates of their counterpart's reservation price that are "inside" the bargaining zone tend to behave consistently with these estimates, which become self-fulfilling, whereas negotiators with initial "outside" estimates revise their perceptions in the face of strong disconfirming evidence. Asymmetric disconfirmation can produce a population-level bias, even when initial perceptions are accurate on average. The authors suggest that asymmetric disconfirmation has implications for confirmation bias and self-fulfilling-prophecy research in social perception.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Larrick, RP; Wu, G

Published Date

  • August 2007

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 93 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 212 - 233

PubMed ID

  • 17645396

Pubmed Central ID

  • 17645396

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1939-1315

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-3514

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1037/0022-3514.93.2.212

Language

  • eng