The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games

Published

Journal Article

The term procedural frames is introduced and defined as different representations of structurally equivalent allocation processes. Study 1 compared 2 well-known games, sequential social dilemmas and ultimatum bargaining, that share the same structure: Player 1 creates an allocation of a resource and Player 2 decides whether to allow it or deny it. Study 1 found that Player 1 made more favorable allocations and Player 2 accepted more unfavorable allocations in a social dilemma frame than in an equivalent ultimatum bargaining frame. Study 2 revealed the critical determinant was whether Player 2 had to respond to an allocation by accepting or rejecting it (as in the ultimatum game) or by making a claim (as in the social dilemma). Two additional studies explored how these actions are perceived. The inconsistency of behavior across procedural frames raises methodological concerns but illuminates construal processes that guide allocation. Copyright 1997 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Larrick, RP; Blount, S

Published Date

  • January 1, 1997

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 72 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 810 - 825

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-3514

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1037/0022-3514.72.4.810

Citation Source

  • Scopus