Sequential regulatory oversight

Journal Article (Journal Article)

We examine a setting where a different regulatory commission controls the activities of a firm in each of two periods. Each commission is concerned primarily with the welfare of contemporary consumers. We examine the efficacy of three different regulatory charters in resolving the intertemporal conflicts that arise between commissions. These charters specify the extent to which the second-period commission is bound to promises made by its predecessor. © 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Lewis, TR; Sappington, DEM

Published Date

  • December 1, 1990

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 2 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 327 - 348

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1573-0468

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0922-680X

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/BF00134475

Citation Source

  • Scopus