Sequential regulatory oversight
Journal Article (Journal Article)
We examine a setting where a different regulatory commission controls the activities of a firm in each of two periods. Each commission is concerned primarily with the welfare of contemporary consumers. We examine the efficacy of three different regulatory charters in resolving the intertemporal conflicts that arise between commissions. These charters specify the extent to which the second-period commission is bound to promises made by its predecessor. © 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Full Text
Duke Authors
Cited Authors
- Lewis, TR; Sappington, DEM
Published Date
- December 1, 1990
Published In
Volume / Issue
- 2 / 4
Start / End Page
- 327 - 348
Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)
- 1573-0468
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
- 0922-680X
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
- 10.1007/BF00134475
Citation Source
- Scopus