The 'Google effect' in the FCC's 700 MHz auction

Journal Article (Journal Article)

We describe and interpret bidding behavior in FCC Auction 73 for the C-block licenses. These licenses were initially offered subject to an open platform restriction, which was highly valued by firms such as Google. Google entered bids until its bids reached the C-block reserve price, thereby ensuring that the open platform restriction would be applied to the licenses. Later in the auction, other bidders outbid Google, so Google was able to trigger the open platform restriction without having to purchase any of the licenses. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Brusco, S; Lopomo, G; Marx, LM

Published Date

  • June 1, 2009

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 21 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 101 - 114

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0167-6245

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2009.03.001

Citation Source

  • Scopus