Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints

Journal Article

We study simultaneous ascending auctions of two identical objects when bidders are financially constrained and their valuations exhibit complementarities. We assume the budget constraints are known but the values for individual objects are private information, and characterize noncollusive equilibria. Equilibrium behavior is affected by the exposure problem. Bidders with higher budgets are more reluctant to bid, because opponents with lower budgets may end up pursuing a single object, thus preventing the realization of complementarities. Therefore poor bidders may win both objects when they do not have the highest valuation. © 2007 Springer-Verlag.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Brusco, S; Lopomo, G

Published Date

  • January 1, 2009

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 38 / 1

Start / End Page

  • 105 - 124

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1432-0479

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0938-2259

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1007/s00199-007-0217-8

Citation Source

  • Scopus