Optimality and robustness of the English auction

Journal Article (Journal Article)

In Milgrom and Weber's (1982, Econometrica 50, 1089-1122) "general symmetric model," under a few additional regularity conditions, the English auction maximizes the seller's expected profit within the class of all posterior-implementable trading procedures and fails to do so among all interim incentive-compatible procedures in which "losers do not pay." These results suggest that appropriate notions of robustness and simplicity which imply the optimality of the English auction for a risk-neutral seller must impose "bargaining-like" features on the set of feasible trading mechanisms. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, D82. © 2000 Academic Press.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Lopomo, G

Published Date

  • January 1, 2001

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 36 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 219 - 240

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0899-8256

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1006/game.2000.0817

Citation Source

  • Scopus