The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions
Publication
, Journal Article
Lopomo, G
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory
September 1, 1998
With private and affiliated buyer's values, the English auction maximizes the seller's expected profit within a large family of sequential bidding mechanisms, named "Simple Sequential Auctions."Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44, D82. © 1998 Academic Press.
Duke Scholars
Published In
Journal of Economic Theory
DOI
ISSN
0022-0531
Publication Date
September 1, 1998
Volume
82
Issue
1
Start / End Page
144 / 166
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1499 Other Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Lopomo, G. (1998). The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 82(1), 144–166. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2425
Lopomo, G. “The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions.” Journal of Economic Theory 82, no. 1 (September 1, 1998): 144–66. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2425.
Lopomo G. The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions. Journal of Economic Theory. 1998 Sep 1;82(1):144–66.
Lopomo, G. “The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions.” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 82, no. 1, Sept. 1998, pp. 144–66. Scopus, doi:10.1006/jeth.1998.2425.
Lopomo G. The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions. Journal of Economic Theory. 1998 Sep 1;82(1):144–166.
Published In
Journal of Economic Theory
DOI
ISSN
0022-0531
Publication Date
September 1, 1998
Volume
82
Issue
1
Start / End Page
144 / 166
Related Subject Headings
- Economic Theory
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 1499 Other Economics
- 1401 Economic Theory