Adaptive Learning and Iterated Weak Dominance

Journal Article (Journal Article)

This article addresses the idea that rational players should not play iteratively weakly dominated strategies by showing that when a particular type of adaptive learning process converges, then players must have learned to play strategy profiles equivalent to those that survive iterated nice weak dominance and, for certain games, equivalent to those that survive iterated weak dominance. For games satisfying the weak single crossing condition, the set of strategies that survive iterated weak dominance is small in that its bounds are pure strategy Nash equilibria. The results hold regardless of the order in which dominated strategies are eliminated.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. © 1999 Academic Press.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Marx, LM

Published Date

  • January 1, 1999

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 26 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 253 - 278

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0899-8256

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1006/game.1998.0660

Citation Source

  • Scopus