Strategic ignorance in a second-price auction

Published

Journal Article

Suppose that bidders may publicly choose not to learn their values prior to a second-price auction with costly bidding. All equilibria with truthful bidding exhibit bidder ignorance when the number of bidders is sufficiently small. Ignorance considerations also affect the optimal reserve price. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • McAdams, D

Published Date

  • January 1, 2012

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 114 / 1

Start / End Page

  • 83 - 85

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0165-1765

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.036

Citation Source

  • Scopus