Mechanism choice and strategic bidding in divisible good auctions: An empirical analysis of the turkish treasury auction market

Published

Journal Article

We propose an estimation method to bound bidders' marginal valuations in discriminatory auctions using individual bid-level data and apply the method to data from the Turkish Treasury auction market. Using estimated bounds on marginal values, we compute an upper bound on the inefficiency of realized allocations as well as bounds on how much additional revenue could have been realized in a counterfactual uniform price or Vickrey auction. We conclude that switching from a discriminatory auction to a uniform price or Vickrey auction would not significantly increase revenue. Moreover, such a switch would increase bidder expected surplus by at most 0.02 percent. © 2010 by The University of Chicago.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Hortaçsu, A; McAdams, D

Published Date

  • October 1, 2010

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 118 / 5

Start / End Page

  • 833 - 865

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-3808

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1086/657948

Citation Source

  • Scopus