On the failure of monotonicity in uniform-price auctions

Published

Journal Article

Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • McAdams, D

Published Date

  • November 1, 2007

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 137 / 1

Start / End Page

  • 729 - 732

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1095-7235

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-0531

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.002

Citation Source

  • Scopus