Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

Published

Journal Article

The first-price auction has a unique monotone pure strategy equilibrium when there are n symmetric risk-averse bidders having affiliated types and interdependent values. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • McAdams, D

Published Date

  • September 1, 2007

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 136 / 1

Start / End Page

  • 144 - 166

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1095-7235

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0022-0531

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.002

Citation Source

  • Scopus