Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: Non-commitment as a strategic tool

Published

Journal Article

In some uniform-price auctions, the auctioneer decides how much to sell after the bidding. Auctioneer expected profit and social welfare can each be strictly higher in all equilibria given such "adjustable supply" than in all equilibria given any fixed quantity and reserve price. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • McAdams, D

Published Date

  • April 1, 2007

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 95 / 1

Start / End Page

  • 48 - 53

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0165-1765

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.035

Citation Source

  • Scopus