Monotone equilibrium in multi-unit auctions

Published

Journal Article

In two-sided multi-unit auctions having a variety of payment rules, including uniform-price and discriminatory auctions, a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium (MPSE) exists when bidders are risk neutral with independent multi-dimensional types and interdependent values. In fact, all mixed-strategy equilibria are ex post allocation and interim expected payment equivalent to MPSE. Thus, for standard expected surplus/ revenue analysis, there is no loss restricting attention to monotone strategies. © 2006 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • McAdams, D

Published Date

  • October 1, 2006

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 73 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 1039 - 1056

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1467-937X

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0034-6527

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00407.x

Citation Source

  • Scopus