Isotone equilibrium in games of incomplete information

Published

Journal Article

An isotone pure strategy equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information in which each player's action set is infinite sublattice of multidimensional Euclidean space, types are multidimensional and atomless, and each player's interim expected payoff function satisfies two "nonprimitive conditions" whenever others adopt isotone pure strategies: (i) single-crossing in own action and type and (ii) quasi-supermodularity in own action. Conditions (i), (ii) are satisfied in supermodular and log-supermodular games given affiliated types, and in games with independent types in which each player's ex post payoff satisfies supermodularity in own action and nondecreasing differences in own action and type. This result is applied to provide the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand, nonprivate values, and independent types.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • McAdams, D

Published Date

  • January 1, 2003

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 71 / 4

Start / End Page

  • 1191 - 1214

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0012-9682

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1111/1468-0262.00443

Citation Source

  • Scopus