Debtor-in-possession financing and bankruptcy resolution: Empirical evidence
Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing is unique secured financing available to firms filing for Chapter 11. Opponents of DIP financing argue that it leads to overinvestment. Alternatively, DIP financing can allow funding for positive net present value projects that increase the likelihood of reorganization and reduce time in bankruptcy. Using a large sample of bankruptcy filings, we find little evidence of systematic overinvestment. DIP financed firms are more likely to emerge from Chapter 11 than non-DIP financed firms. DIP financed firms have a shorter reorganization period; they are quicker to emerge and also quicker to liquidate. The reorganization period is even shorter when prior lenders provide the DIP financing. © 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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Citation
Published In
DOI
ISSN
Publication Date
Volume
Issue
Start / End Page
Related Subject Headings
- Finance
- 3801 Applied economics
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment
- 1606 Political Science
- 1502 Banking, Finance and Investment
- 1402 Applied Economics