Agents' incentives under buy-back contracts in a two-stage supply chain

Published

Journal Article

This paper investigates how the behavior of individual decision makers can affect the performance of a supply chain. We study a two-stage supplier-retailer system, using a buy-back contract. Each firm's actions are executed by an agent. The retailer's purchasing agent and the supplier's sales agent are compensated based on certain performance measures, and they act accordingly. We study the impacts of their behavior in both the supplier-as-leader and retailer-as-leader settings. We find that, unless their incentives are carefully constructed, the agents can strongly distort the system's behavior. Specifically, "channel stuffing" (packing the distribution channel with excess inventory) can occur in both settings. Only when the agents are compensated based on net profit do they act in accord with their firms' objectives. These results may help explain some recent scandals. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Wang, Y; Zipkin, P

Published Date

  • August 1, 2009

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 120 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 525 - 539

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0925-5273

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.1016/j.ijpe.2009.04.008

Citation Source

  • Scopus