Expanding "Choice" in School Choice
Publication
, Other
Abdulkadiroglu, A; Che, Y-K; Yasuda, Y
2008
Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency.
Duke Scholars
Publication Date
2008
Related Subject Headings
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment
- 14 Economics
Citation
APA
Chicago
ICMJE
MLA
NLM
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Che, Y.-K., & Yasuda, Y. (2008). Expanding "Choice" in School Choice.
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Y. -. K. Che, and Y. Yasuda. “Expanding "Choice" in School Choice,” 2008.
Abdulkadiroglu A, Che Y-K, Yasuda Y. Expanding "Choice" in School Choice. 2008.
Abdulkadiroglu, A., et al. Expanding "Choice" in School Choice. 2008.
Abdulkadiroglu A, Che Y-K, Yasuda Y. Expanding "Choice" in School Choice. 2008.
Publication Date
2008
Related Subject Headings
- 3803 Economic theory
- 3801 Applied economics
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment
- 14 Economics