Legal protection in retail financial markets
Publication
, Scholarly Edition
Carlin, BI; Gervais, S
September 1, 2012
We model a retail financial institution that outsources its advice services to an intermediary, making the two parties jointly responsible for consumers' experience with the products. In this context, courts that enforce state-contingent legal rules are necessary in order to avoid market breakdowns. To maximize social welfare, the government implements a system of penalties that depends on product characteristics and on the firm's relative ability to control quality. This legal system emphasizes reliable advice over transaction pace. Furthermore, the implicit team structure of the firm and its intermediary prevents self-regulation from achieving the same social efficiency.
Duke Scholars
DOI
Publication Date
September 1, 2012
Start / End Page
68 / 108
Related Subject Headings
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment
Citation
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ICMJE
MLA
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Carlin, B. I., & Gervais, S. (2012). Legal protection in retail financial markets. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfs003
Carlin, B. I., and S. Gervais. “Legal protection in retail financial markets,” September 1, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfs003.
Carlin BI, Gervais S. Legal protection in retail financial markets. 2012. p. 68–108.
Carlin, B. I., and S. Gervais. Legal protection in retail financial markets. 1 Sept. 2012, pp. 68–108. Scopus, doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfs003.
Carlin BI, Gervais S. Legal protection in retail financial markets. 2012. p. 68–108.
DOI
Publication Date
September 1, 2012
Start / End Page
68 / 108
Related Subject Headings
- 3502 Banking, finance and investment