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Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems

Publication ,  Scholarly Edition
Iversen, T; Soskice, D; Cusack, TR
May 25, 2009

The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan's seminal, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR-minimum winning coalitions versus consensus-we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.

Duke Scholars

Publication Date

May 25, 2009
 

Citation

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Iversen, T., Soskice, D., & Cusack, T. R. (2009). Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems.
Iversen, Torben, David Soskice, and Thomas R. Cusack. “Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems,” May 25, 2009.
Iversen T, Soskice D, Cusack TR. Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. 2009.
Iversen, Torben, et al. Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. 25 May 2009.
Iversen T, Soskice D, Cusack TR. Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. 2009.

Publication Date

May 25, 2009