Coordination in split award auctions
Published
Journal Article
We analyze split award procurement auctions in which a buyer divides full production between two suppliers or awards all production to a single supplier, and suppliers have private cost information. An intriguing feature of split awards is that the equilibrium bids are implicitly coordinated. Because a split award price is the sum of offered split prices, each supplier can unilaterally veto a split award by bidding very high for the split. The need to coordinate is reflected in a split pri;e that does not vary with private information. We also explore conditions under which split award auctions may be preferred to winner-take-all auctions. © President and Fellows of Harvard College.
Full Text
Duke Authors
Cited Authors
- Anton, JJ; Yao, DA
Published Date
- January 1, 1992
Published In
Volume / Issue
- 107 / 2
Start / End Page
- 681 - 707
Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)
- 1531-4650
International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)
- 0033-5533
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
- 10.2307/2118486
Citation Source
- Scopus