Coordination in split award auctions

Published

Journal Article

We analyze split award procurement auctions in which a buyer divides full production between two suppliers or awards all production to a single supplier, and suppliers have private cost information. An intriguing feature of split awards is that the equilibrium bids are implicitly coordinated. Because a split award price is the sum of offered split prices, each supplier can unilaterally veto a split award by bidding very high for the split. The need to coordinate is reflected in a split pri;e that does not vary with private information. We also explore conditions under which split award auctions may be preferred to winner-take-all auctions. © President and Fellows of Harvard College.

Full Text

Duke Authors

Cited Authors

  • Anton, JJ; Yao, DA

Published Date

  • January 1, 1992

Published In

Volume / Issue

  • 107 / 2

Start / End Page

  • 681 - 707

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1531-4650

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0033-5533

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

  • 10.2307/2118486

Citation Source

  • Scopus